

Application of Information Theory, Lecture 9

Parallel Repetition of Interactive Arguments

Handout Mode

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December 15, 2011

Part I

Interactive Proofs and Arguments

\mathcal{NP} as a Non-interactive Proofs

Definition 1 (\mathcal{NP})

$\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ iff \exists and poly-time algorithm V such that:

- ▶ $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$ there exists $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ s.t. $V(x, w) = 1$
- ▶ $V(x, w) = 0$ for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$

Only $|x|$ counts for the running time of V .

This proof system has

- ▶ Efficient verifier, efficient prover (given the witness)
- ▶ Soundness holds unconditionally

Interactive proofs/arguments

Protocols between **efficient** verifier and **unbounded/efficient** prover.

Definition 2 (Interactive proof)

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is a **PPT** and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$: $\Pr[(P, V)(x) = 1] \geq 2/3$.

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* : $\Pr[(P^*, V)(x) = 1] \leq 1/3$.

IP is the class of languages that have interactive proofs.

- ▶ $IP = PSPACE!$
- ▶ The above protocol has **completeness error** $\frac{1}{3}$, and **soundness error** $\frac{1}{3}$
- ▶ We typically consider achieve (directly) perfect completeness.
- ▶ Smaller “soundness error” achieved via repetition.
- ▶ Relaxation: **interactive arguments** [also known as, **Computationally sound proofs**]: soundness only guaranteed against **efficient** (PPT) provers.
- ▶ Games — no-input protocols.

Section 1

Interactive Proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- ▶ $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$
- ▶ Does $\mathcal{GNI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?
- ▶ We will show a simple interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI}
Idea: Beer tasting...

Interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI}

Protocol 4 $((P, V)(G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1)))$

1. V chooses $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$, and sends $\pi(E_b)$ to P .^a
2. P send b' to V (tries to set $b' = b$).
3. V accepts iff $b' = b$.

$$^a \pi(E) = \{(\pi(u), \pi(v)) : (u, v) \in E\}.$$

Claim 5

The above protocol is IP for \mathcal{GNI} , with perfect completeness and soundness error $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proving Claim 5

- ▶ Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates all graph pairs into separate subsets)
- ▶ $([m], \pi(E_i))$ is a random element in $[G_i]$ — the equivalence class of G_i

Hence,

$$G_0 \equiv G_1: \Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2}.$$

$$G_0 \not\equiv G_1: \Pr[b' = b] = 1 \text{ (i.e., } P \text{ can, possibly inefficiently, extracted from } \pi(E_i))$$

□

Part II

Hardness Amplification

Hardness amplification

- ▶ In most settings we need **very small** soundness error (i.e., close to 0)
- ▶ Typically done by “amplifying the security” of an interactive proof/argument of **large** soundness error.
- ▶ Two main approaches:
 - ▶ **Sequential** repetition: achieves optimal amplification rate in almost any computation model, but increases the round complexity
 - ▶ **Parallel** repetition: sometimes does not achieve optimal amplification rate and sometimes achieves **nothing**
- ▶ How come parallel repetition might not work? **Example**
- ▶ Parallel repetition **does** achieve optimal amplification rate for interactive proofs and public-coin interactive arguments
- ▶ Public-coin interactive proof/argument — in each round the verifier flips coins and sends them to the prover. To compute its output, the verifier applies some (fixed) function to the protocol’s transcript.

Hardness amplification, cont.

- ▶ Give a protocol $\pi = (P, V)$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$, let $\pi^{(k)} = (P^{(k)}, V^{(k)})$ be the k -fold parallel repetition of π : i.e., k parallel independent copies of π
- ▶ Assume $\Pr[(\tilde{P}, V) = 1] \leq \varepsilon$ for any s -size algorithm \tilde{P} , we would like to prove that $\Pr[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}^{(k)}, V^{(k)}) = 1^k] \leq f^{(k)}(\varepsilon)$ for any $s^{(k)}$ -size algorithm $\widetilde{P^{(k)}}^{(k)}$.
- ▶ Typically, $s^{(k)} = s \cdot \text{poly}(f^{(k)}(\varepsilon)/k)$
- ▶ If $f(\varepsilon) = \varepsilon^{\Omega(k)}$, the above is an exponential-rate amplification (and hence optimal)
- ▶ If $f(\varepsilon) = \varepsilon^{\delta_1 \cdot k^{\delta_2}}$, the above is a weakly-exponential-rate amplification
- ▶ Why size?
- ▶ Concrete security
- ▶ In the following we focus on games (no input protocols)

Section 2

Parallel repetition of public-coin interactive argument

Parallel repetition of public-coin interactive argument

Theorem 6

Let $\pi = (P, V)$ be m -round, public-coin protocol with $\Pr[(\tilde{P}, V) = 1] \leq \varepsilon$ for any s -size \tilde{P} , then $\Pr[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}), V^{(k)}) = 1^k] \leq \varepsilon^{k/4}$ for any $s \cdot \frac{\varepsilon^{k/4}}{mk^3 s_V}$ -size $\widetilde{P^{(k)}}$, where s_V is V 's size.

Proof plan: Let $\widetilde{P^{(k)}}$ be $s^{(k)}$ -size algorithm with $\Pr[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}), V^{(k)}) = 1^k] = \varepsilon^{(k)}$, we construct $s^{(k)} \cdot \frac{mk^3 s_V}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}$ -size \tilde{P} with $\Pr[(\tilde{P}, V) = 1] \geq (\varepsilon^{(k)})^{4/k}$.

- ▶ The $k/4$ in the exponent can be pushed to be almost k .
- ▶ Assume for simplicity that $\widetilde{P^{(k)}}$ is deterministic
- ▶ Assume wlg. that V sends the first message in π and that in each round it sends ℓ coins.
- ▶ We view the coins of $V^{(k)}$ as a matrix $R \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times (k\ell)}$, letting R_j denote the coins of the j 'th round
- ▶ Let $x^j = x_1, \dots, x_j$ (hence R^j denote the coins used in the first j rounds).
- ▶ Let $R \sim \{0, 1\}^{m \times (k\ell)}$

Algorithm \tilde{P}

Let $q = k^2$.

Algorithm 7 (\tilde{P})

1. Let $i^* \leftarrow [k]$.
 2. Upon getting the j 'th round message r from V , do:
 - 2.1 Let $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times (k\ell)}$, conditioned that $R_{1,\dots,j-1} = \tilde{R}_{1,\dots,j-1}$ and $R_{j,i^*} = r$.
 - 2.2 If $(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R)) = 1^k$:
 - 2.2.1 Set $\tilde{R}_j = R_j$
 - 2.2.2 Send a_{j,i^*} back to V , for a_j being the j 'th message $\widetilde{P^{(k)}}$ send to $V^{(k)}$ in $(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R))$.
 - Else, GOTO Line 2.1
 - 2.3 Abort, if overall number of sampling exceeds $\lceil qm/\varepsilon^{(k)} \rceil$.
- Let \tilde{P}' be the non aborting variant of \tilde{P} , let \tilde{R} and \tilde{N} be the value of \tilde{R} and $\#$ of samples done in a random execution of $(\tilde{P}', V^{(k)})$, respectively.
- $\Pr[(\tilde{P}, V) = 1] \geq \Pr[\text{win}(\tilde{R}, \tilde{N}) := (\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(\tilde{R})) = 1^k \wedge \tilde{N} \leq qm/\varepsilon^{(k)}]$.

Ideal “attacker”

Experiment 8 (\hat{P})

For $j = 1$ to m :

1. Let $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times (k\ell)}$, conditioned that $R_{1,\dots,j-1} = \hat{R}_{1,\dots,j-1}$.
 2. If $(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R)) = 1^k$, set $\hat{R}_j = R_j$. Else, GOTO Line 1.
- ▶ Let \hat{R} be the value of \hat{R} in the end of a random execution of \hat{P} .
 - ▶ $\hat{R} \sim R|_{(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R))=1^k}$
 - ▶ In particular, $\Pr[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(\hat{R})) = 1^k] = 1$
 - ▶ Let \hat{N} be # of samples done in \hat{P} .

Lemma 9

$$\Pr[\hat{N} > qm/\varepsilon^{(k)}] < \frac{1}{q}$$

$$\text{Hence, } \Pr[\text{win}(\hat{R}, \hat{N})] = \Pr[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(\hat{R})) = 1^k \wedge \hat{N} \leq qm/\varepsilon^{(k)}] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{q}$$

Proving Lemma 9 — $\Pr \left[\hat{N} > qm/\varepsilon^{(k)} \right] < \frac{1}{q}$

- ▶ Let $(X_1, \dots, X_m) = \mathbf{R}$ and $(Y_1, \dots, Y_m) = \hat{\mathbf{R}}$
- ▶ For $\mathbf{y} \in \text{Supp}(Y^j)$, let
$$v(\mathbf{y}) := \Pr \left[(\widetilde{P^{(k)}})^{(k)}(X^m) = 1^k \mid X^j = \mathbf{y} \right]$$
- ▶ Conditioned on $Y^j = \mathbf{y}$, the expected # of samples done in $(j+1)$ 'th round of \hat{P} is $\frac{1}{v(\mathbf{y})}$.
- ▶ We prove Lemma 9 showing that $\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{v(Y^j)} \right] \leq \frac{1}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}$ for every $j \in \{0, \dots, m-1\}$

Claim 10

For $j \in \{0, \dots, m-1\}$ and $\mathbf{y} \in \text{Supp}(Y^j)$, it holds that $\Pr_{Y^j}[\mathbf{y}] = \Pr_{X^j}[\mathbf{y}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Hence, } \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{v(Y^j)} \right] &= \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in \text{Supp}(Y^j)} \Pr[Y^j = \mathbf{y}] \cdot \frac{1}{v(\mathbf{y})} \\ &= \sum_{\mathbf{y}} \Pr[X^j = \mathbf{y}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}} \cdot \frac{1}{v(\mathbf{y})} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon^{(k)}} \cdot \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in \text{Supp}(Y^j)} \Pr[X^j = \mathbf{y}] \leq \frac{1}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proving Claim 10 — $\Pr_{Y^j}[\mathbf{y}] = \Pr_{X^j}[\mathbf{y}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}$

Recall $v(\mathbf{y}) := \Pr \left[(\widetilde{P}^{(k)}, V^{(k)})(X^m) = 1^k \mid X^j = \mathbf{y} \right]$. Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{Y_j | Y^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] &= \sum_{\ell=1}^{\infty} (1 - v(\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}))^{\ell-1} \cdot \Pr_{X_j | X^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] \cdot v(\mathbf{y}) \quad (1) \\ &= \frac{1}{v(\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1})} \cdot \Pr_{X_j | X^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] \cdot v(\mathbf{y}) \end{aligned}$$

The proof proceeds by induction on j .

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{Y^j}[\mathbf{y}] &= \Pr_{Y^{j-1}}[\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}] \cdot \Pr_{Y_j | Y^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] \\ &= \Pr_{X^{j-1}}[\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}} \cdot \Pr_{Y_j | Y^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] \quad (\text{i.h.}) \\ &= \Pr_{X^{j-1}}[\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}} \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y})}{v(\mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1})} \cdot \Pr_{X_j | X^{j-1} = \mathbf{y}_{1, \dots, j-1}}[y_j] \quad (\text{Eq. (1)}) \\ &= \Pr_{X^j}[\mathbf{y}] \cdot \frac{v(\mathbf{y})}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}. \end{aligned}$$

From ideal to real

Let $\tilde{\mathbf{I}}$ be the value of i^* in $\tilde{\mathbf{P}}$.

Claim 11

$$D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}) \leq \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}|_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}).$$

Claim 12

$$\sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}|_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}) \leq D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \mathbf{R}).$$

1. Thm. 7 in Lecture 7 $\implies D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \mathbf{R}) \leq \log \frac{1}{\Pr[(\tilde{\mathbf{P}}^{(k)}, \mathbf{V}^{(k)}(\mathbf{R}))=1^k]} \leq \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon^{(k)}}$
2. Hence, $D(\text{win}(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}) \| \text{win}(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}})) \leq D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}) \leq -\frac{1}{k} \cdot \log \varepsilon^{(k)}$
3. Lemma 15 $\implies \alpha := \Pr[\text{win}(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}})] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{q}$, and let $\beta := \Pr[\text{win}(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}})]$.
4. By (2), $\alpha \cdot \log \frac{\alpha}{\beta} + (1 - \alpha) \log \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \beta} \leq -\frac{1}{k} \cdot \log \varepsilon^{(k)}$
 $\implies \beta \geq 2^{\log \alpha + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \log(1 - \alpha) + \frac{1}{\alpha k} \log \varepsilon^{(k)}}$
5. Since $q = k^2$: $\alpha \geq 2^{-\frac{2}{q}} \geq 2^{-\frac{1}{k}}$ and $\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \log(1 - \alpha) \geq -\frac{4 \log k}{k^2} \geq -\frac{1}{k}$
6. We conclude that $\beta \geq 2^{\frac{4}{k} \log \varepsilon^{(k)}} = \sqrt[k/4]{\varepsilon^{(k)}}. \square$

Proving Claim 12 — $\sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}) \leq D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \mathbf{R})$

Lemma 13

Let $\mathbf{Z} = \{Z_{ij}\}_{(i,j) \in [k] \times [m]}$ be iids and let W be an event. For $z \in \text{Supp}(\mathbf{Z})$, let

$$\xi_i(z) := \prod_{j=1}^m \Pr[Z_{j,i} = z_{i,j}] \cdot \Pr[Z_{j,-i} = z_{i,j-1} | Z_{1,\dots,j-1} = z_{1,\dots,j-1} \wedge Z_{j,i} = z_{i,j} \wedge W].$$

Then $\sum_{i=1}^k D(Z|_W \| \xi_i) \leq D(Z|_W \| Z)$.

Letting $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{R}$ and W be the event $(\widetilde{\mathbf{P}}^{(k)}, \mathbf{V}^{(k)}(\mathbf{R})) = 1^k$, Lemma 13 yields that $\sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}) = \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\mathbf{R}|_W \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}) \leq D(\mathbf{R}|_W \| \mathbf{R}) = D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \mathbf{R})$. \square

Proving Lemma 13

We prove for $m = k = 2$.

$Z = (X_0, X_1, Y_0, Y_1)$ iids and W an event.

$$\xi_i(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) := \Pr[X_i = x_i] \cdot \Pr[X_{\bar{i}} = x_{\bar{i}} \mid X_i = x_i \wedge W] \cdot \\ \Pr[Y_i = y_i] \cdot \Pr[Y_{\bar{i}} = y_{\bar{i}} \mid Y_i = y_i \wedge (X_0, X_1) = (x_0, x_1) \wedge W].$$

We need to prove that $\sum_{i=1}^2 D(Z|_W || \xi_i) \leq D(Z|_W || Z)$.

► Let $U = p_Z$ and $C = p_{Z|W}$.

► Let $X = (X_0, X_1)$

► $Q(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) := \Pr[X_0 = x_0 | W] \cdot \Pr[X_1 = x_1 | W] \cdot \\ \Pr[Y_0 = y_0 | W, X = (x_0, x_1)] \cdot \Pr[Y_1 = y_1 | W, X = (x_0, x_1)]$

► We write $\frac{C(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)}{U(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)} =$
 $\frac{\Pr[X_0=x_0|W] \cdot \Pr[Y_0=y_0|W, X=(x_0, x_1)]}{\Pr[X_0=x_0] \cdot \Pr[Y_0=y_0]} \cdot \frac{\Pr[X_1=x_1|W] \cdot \Pr[Y_1=y_1|W, X=(x_0, x_1)]}{\Pr[X_1=x_1] \cdot \Pr[Y_1=y_1]} \cdot \frac{C(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)}{Q(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)}$

Proving Lemma 13, cont.

$$\begin{aligned} D(C||U) &= \mathbb{E}_{(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) \leftarrow C} \left[\log \frac{\Pr[X_0 = x_0|W] \cdot \Pr[Y_0 = y_0|W, X = (x_0, x_1)]}{\Pr[X_0 = x_0] \cdot \Pr[Y_0 = y_0]} \right] \\ &+ \mathbb{E}_{(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) \leftarrow C} \left[\log \frac{\Pr[X_1 = x_1|W] \cdot \Pr[Y_1 = y_1|W, X = (x_0, x_1)]}{\Pr[X_1 = x_1] \cdot \Pr[Y_1 = y_1]} \right] \\ &+ \mathbb{E}_{(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) \leftarrow C} \left[\log \frac{C(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)}{Q(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1)} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} D(C||U) &= D(X_0|w, X_1|w, x_0, Y_0|w, x, Y_1|w, x, y_0 || X_0, X_1|w, x_0, Y_0, Y_1|w, x, y_0) \\ &+ D(X_1|w, X_1|w, x_1, Y_1|w, x, Y_1|w, x, y_1 || X_1, X_1|w, x_1, Y_1, Y_1|w, x, y_1) \\ &+ D(C||Q) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^2 D(Z|w || \xi_i) + D(C||Q) \\ &\geq \sum_{i=1}^2 D(Z|w || \xi_i). \square \end{aligned}$$

Ideal “attacker”, variant

Experiment 14 (\hat{P})

1. Let $i^* \leftarrow [k]$.
 2. For $j = 1$ to m :
 - 2.1 Let $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times (k\ell)}$, conditioned on $R_{1,\dots,j-1} = \hat{R}_{1,\dots,j-1}$.
 - 2.2 If $(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R)) = 1^k$, set $\hat{R}_{j,i^*} = R_{j,i^*}$. Else, GOTO Line 2.1.
 - 2.3 Let $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times \ell}$, conditioned on $R_{1,\dots,j-1} = \hat{R}_{1,\dots,j-1}$ and $R_{j,i^*} = \hat{R}_{j,i^*}$.
 - 2.4 If $(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(R)) = 1^k$, set $\hat{R}_j = R_j$. Else, GOTO Line 2.3.
- ▶ Let $\hat{\mathbf{R}}$ be the final value of \hat{R} in \hat{P} .
 - ▶ $\hat{\mathbf{R}} \sim \mathbf{R} \big|_{(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(\mathbf{R})) = 1^k}$
 - ▶ Let $\hat{\mathbf{N}}$ be the # of Step-2.3-samples done in \hat{P} .

Lemma 15 (essentially the same proof as of Lemma 9)

$$\Pr [\text{win}(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}})] = \Pr [(\widetilde{P^{(k)}}, V^{(k)}(\hat{\mathbf{R}})) = 1^k \wedge \hat{\mathbf{N}} \leq qm/\varepsilon^{(k)}] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{q}$$

Proving Claim 11 — $D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}) \leq \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}|_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i})$

Let $\hat{\mathbf{I}}$ be the value of i^* in $\hat{\mathbf{P}}$ (recall that $\tilde{\mathbf{I}}$ is the value of i^* in $\tilde{\mathbf{P}}$).

Let $(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)}) = (\tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}})|_{\tilde{\mathbf{I}}=i}$ and $(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)}) = (\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}})|_{\hat{\mathbf{I}}=i}$. Note that $\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)} = \hat{\mathbf{R}}$.

$$D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}) \leq D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}, \hat{\mathbf{I}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}, \tilde{\mathbf{I}}) \quad (\text{data-processing})$$

$$= D(\hat{\mathbf{I}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{I}}) + \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)}) \quad (\text{chain rule})$$

$$= \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)})$$

For $i \in [k]$, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)}) &= D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}) + \mathbb{E}_{r \leftarrow \hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}} \left[D(\hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} |_{\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}=r} \| \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} |_{\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}=r}) \right] \quad (\text{chain rule}) \\ &= D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}) \quad (\text{since } \hat{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} |_{\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}=r} \equiv \tilde{\mathbf{N}}_{(i)} |_{\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}=r}) \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mathbf{N}} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}, \tilde{\mathbf{N}}) \leq \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in [k]} D(\hat{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)} \| \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_{(i)}) \quad \square$

Parallel repetition of interactive proofs

- ▶ Similar proof to the public-coin proof we gave above.
- ▶ In each round, the attacker \tilde{P} samples **random continuations** of $(\tilde{P}^{(k)}, V^{(k)})$, till he gets an accepting execution.
- ▶ Why fails us to extend this approach for non-public-coin interactive arguments?

Section 3

Parallel amplification for any interactive argument

Parallel amplification theorem for any protocol

- ▶ Can we amplify the security of any interactive argument “in parallel”?
- ▶ Yes we **can**!

Relevant papers

- ▶ Kai-Min Chung and Rafael Pass: [Tight Parallel Repetition Theorems for Public-Coin Arguments using KL-divergence](#).

The proof given in class is in the spirit of this paper.